Indonesian constitutional reform, 1999-2002: an evaluation of constitution-making in transition

Indonesian constitutional reform, 1999-2002: an evaluation of constitution-making in transition

Indonesian constitutional reform, 1999-2002: an evaluation of constitution-making in transition

Law of Asia (South, Southeast, East) Countries A-J > Law of Indonesia > Indonesia > General; General

Edition Details

  • Creator or Attribution (Responsibility): Denny Indrayana
  • Language: English
  • Jurisdiction(s): Indonesia
  • Publication Information: Jakarta : Kompas Book Pub., 2008
  • Material: Internet resource
  • Type: Book, Internet Resource
  • Permalink: https://books.lawi.asia/indonesian-constitutional-reform-1999-2002-an-evaluation-of-constitution-making-in-transition/ (Stable identifier)

Short Description

XXIII, 463 pages : ILlustrations ; 21 cm

Purpose and Intended Audience

Useful for students learning an area of law, Indonesian constitutional reform, 1999-2002: an evaluation of constitution-making in transition is also useful for lawyers seeking to apply the law to issues arising in practice.

Research References

  • Providing references to further research sources: Search

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Bibliographic information

  • Responsable Person: Denny Indrayana.
  • Publication Date: 2008
  • Country/State: Indonesia
  • Number of Editions: 5 editions
  • First edition Date: 2005
  • Last edition Date: 2008
  • General Notes: Revision of the author's thesis (Ph. D.)–Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne, 2005.
  • Languages: English
  • Library of Congress Code: KNW2101
  • Dewey Code: 342.59803
  • ISBN: 9789797093945 9797093948
  • OCLC: 311903757

Table of Contents

* CHAPTER ONE:
IN SEARCH OF A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION – 3

A. Introduction – 3

B. Thesis Questions – 5

C. W hy this Study is Im portant – 5

1. The Four Failures of Indonesian Constitutional Reform 6
a. The 1945 Constitution: A Temporary, Express
and Revolutionary Constitution – 6

b. The 1949 Constitution: A Temporary Federal
Co nstitutio n – 7

c. The 1950 Provisional Constitution: A more
Democratic but Temporary Constitution – 9

d. The Konstituante's Constitutional Draft:
An Unfinished Democratic Constitution?… 10
2. The Nationalism versus Islamic state Constitutional
D ebates – 13

3. The Importance of the 1999-2002
Constitutional Reform – 17

D. Thesis Overview – 18

1. Focus of the Study – 18

2. Research Methodology – 19

3. Thesis Outline – 20

PART TWO:
THE THEORETICAL APPROACH
* CHAPTER TWO: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
OF DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING – 25

A. Introduction – 25

1. Constitution – 27

2. Constitution-Making – 32

3. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule – 37

B. The Key Features of Constitution-Making – 40

1. When Constitution-Making should occur – 41

2. How a Democratic Constitution-Making Process
should be conducted – 48

a. Does Process M atter?… 48
b. Stages of Constitution-Making – 54

3. Who the constitution-making body should be – 61

a. Expert Commission – 63

b. Normal Legislature – 70

4. The Importance of Public Participation – 76

C. The Elements of a Democratic Constitution – 82

1. Democracy and Constitution – 83

2. Democratic Constitution – 89

a. No Single Formula – 90

b. Elements of a Democratic Constitution – 92

PART THREE:
AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE 1945 CONSTITUTION
* CHAPTER THREE: SOEHARTO'S AUTHORITARIANISM
AND THE URGENCY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM – 105

A. Soeharto's Authoritarian Order – 106

1. Indonesia under Soekarno: an Old Authoritarian Order 107
2. Indonesia under Soeharto: a New Authoritarian Order 112
a. Soeharto's One Party System – 113

b. Soeharto's Personal Dictatorship – 117

c. Soeharto's Military Regime – 121

B. Authoritarianism in the 1945 Constitution – 123

1. 'Executive-Heavy' Constitution – 125

2. Unclear System of Checks and Balances – 127

3. Too Many Delegations to Statute – 129

4. Ambiguous Articles – 130

5. Too Much Dependence on Political Goodwill
and Integrity – 131

6. Legal Vacuums – 133

7. The Elucidation – 135

PART FOUR:
THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTION-MAKING OF 1999-2002
* CHAPTER FOUR: THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
AMENDING THE SACRED CONSTITUTION – 143

A. The Back Ground: the Pre-Amendment Period – 143

1. Habibie's Presidency – 144

a. The 1998 MPR Special Session – 146

b. The 1999 Electoral Reform – 147

c. Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Expression 148
d. Releasing Political Prisoners – 149

e. The 1999 General Election – 150

2. The Election Result – 151

B. The First Amendment: the Process – 157

1. When the Constitution-Making should occur – 157

2. How the Constitution-Making was Conducted – 161

a. Amendment Yes, Renewal No – 162

b. The Preamble No, the Body and the Elucidation Yes 165
3. Who the Constitution-Making Body was to be – 167

4. How Public Participation was Organized – 170

C. The First Amendment: the Outcomes – 172

1. Similar Amendments Proposals – 172

2. No to the President, Yes to the DPR – 176

* CHAPTER FIVE: THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
FURTHER REFORMS, CONTINUED DELAYS – 182

A. The Background: the Shaky Situation – 182

1. Political Conflicts – 183

2. Social Conflicts – 184

3. Econom ic Crisis – 185

B. The Second Amendment: the Process – 186

1. When the Constitution-Making should occur – 186

a. Timeline of the Discussions – 186

b. The MPR's Changing Schedule – 188

c. The Public's Position – 189

2. How the Constitution-Making was Conducted – 190

a. Preserving the Preamble, the Unitary State – 190

and the Presidential System – 190

b. Not a Totally New Constitution,… 193
but a Total Rewrite of the Old Constitution – 193

c. Conservative Versus Progressive Groups – 196

d. Short-Term Political Interests – 199

3. Who the Constitution-Making Body was to be – 202

a. The M PR's Position – 202

b. Public Position – 205

4. How the Public Participation was organized – 206

C. The Second Amendment: the Outcomes – 213

1. The Regional Governments: No to Centralization – 215

2. Bill of Rights: No to Human Rights Violations – 217

3. National Defense and Security:
Mixed Results on the Role of the Military in Politics.. 222
4. Further Amendment to the Powers of the DPR – 225

* CHAPTER SIX: THE THIRD AMENDMENT:
IMPORTANT REFORMS, CRUCIAL DELAYS – 228

A. The Background: Abdurrahman Wahid's Impeachment – 228

1. The Legal Authority for Presidential Impeachment – 229

2. The Process of President Wahid's Impeachment – 233

3. The Need for Constitutional Reform – 238

B. The Third Amendment: the Process – 239

1. How the Constitution-Making was conducted – 239

a. Four Amendments, One New Constitution?… 284
b. The Transparency of the MPR Meetings – 287

c. Short-Term Political Interests – 291

3. Who the Constitution-Making body was to be – 296

a. The Pro Commission Movement – 296

b. A 'constitutional commission',
but not a 'Constitutional Commission'… 300
c. The Coalition: the MPR's Cheating – 301

d. The TNI-Polri's Hidden Agenda?… 302
4. How the Public Participation was organized – 304

C. The Fourth Amendment: the Outcomes – 307

1. The Amended Articles – 307

a. The Composition of the MPR – 307

b. The Second Round Presidential Election – 308

c. The Liquidation of the DPA – 308

d. The Currency and the Central Bank – 309

e. The Education and Culture – 309

f. The Compromised Economic Provision – 310

g. Procedure to Amend the Constitution – 311

h. Transitional and Additional Provisions – 312

2. The Important Rejected Proposal: Article 29 – 313

PART FIVE:
EVALUATION, RECOMMENDATIONSAND CONCLUSION
*CHAPTER EIGHT: AN UNDERSTANDABLY MESSY PROCESS,
MORE DEMOCRATIC OUTCOMES – 321

A. The Four Amendments: the Process – 322

1. When the Constitution-Making should occur – 322

a. The Pre-Amendment Period – 322

b. The 1999 – 2002 Transitional Period:
the Golden Moment – 325

c. The 1999 – 2002 Amendment Period:
A Changing Schedule – 325

2. How the Constitution-Making was Conducted – 327

a. The 1945 Constitution as
a Transitional Constitution – 327

b. The Five Basic Agreements – 329

c. Four Amendments, a New Constitution – 330

d. A Process by Accident not Design – 333

e. The Political Interests – 334

f. Transparency – 337

3. Who the Constitution-Making Body was to be – 339

a. The M PR – 339

b. The Constitutional Commission – 344

c. The Fake Constitutional Commission – 347

4. The Public Participation:
Limited and badly Organized – 348

B. An Unavoidably Messy Process – 352

C. The Four Amendments: the Outcomes – 360

1. Legislative Reform – 361

a. Structural Reform – 361

b. Functional Reform – 361

b. Shortcomings – 367

c. Recom m endations – 369

3. Executive Reform – 370

a. Towards a Conventional Presidential System – 370

b. Shortcom ings – 374

c. Recom m endations – 375

3. Judicial Reform – 376

a. Structural Reform – 376

b. Judicial Review – 378

c. Recom mendation – 380

4. Human Rights Reform – 380

a. Im pressive Reform – 380

b. Shortcom ings – 381

c. Recommendations – 382

5. The Nationalism v.
Islamic State Constitutional Debates – 382

D. Co nclusio n – 384

Structured Subjects (Headings):

Unstructured Subjects (Headings):

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